CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.472
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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. K. AHMED (Pakistan)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
	Mr. R.E. MOORE
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. F. MARESKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
	Mr. G. ALEMU
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. I. SARKADI
	Mr. F. GAJDA
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. H. TANAKA
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
	Mr. K. ANDO
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Mr. B. SEPULVEDA
	Mr. R. VALERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. B. DASHTSEREN
Morocco:	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. DOS
Nigeria:	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. N. CHILIE
	Mrs. F. DINU
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. T. WULFF
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
	Mr. R. HOULISTON
	Mr. L.W. BOYES
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. HEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Pakistan): I declare open the 472nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): It is essential for meaningful consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament to appreciate the context in which we strive to make progress towards this goal. The interrelationship of disarmament and international affairs is central. The disarmament policies of all governments are only one aspect of their foreign policies; and their disarmament policies, like their foreign policies, are shaped by their aspirations, their expectations, their concerns and even their fears regarding the world situation, and by what they judge to be their national security interests.

3. The resolution on general and complete disarmament adopted by the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly (2602 (XXIV); CCD/275) differed in several respects from those of earlier years. The most important difference was that, instead of urging us to renew our efforts towards progress in reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament, this resolution requested that we work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament as a guide for our further work and negotiations. The United States, Members will recall, had reservations about the language of this resolution; but we voted for it because we believed it was both reasonable and important for this Committee to take up questions that would be involved in the elaboration of any programme regarding disarmament.

4. In my statement today I intend to discuss the question of general and complete disarmament in relation to that resolution. In doing so I shall first talk about the context of general and complete disarmament -- that is, the progress which must be made in the world if we are to make real progress towards general and complete disarmament. I shall then discuss in general terms arms control and disarmament measures and their relation to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

5. I want to make clear at the outset that we continue to support the goal of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, however, I think that all of us will agree that progress towards general and complete disarmament cannot be made in a vacuum but will have to be accompanied by concrete progress towards a peaceful world. Such a peaceful world, in which general and complete disarmament could be realized, would be:

- A world in which the rule of law, and not the use of force, prevailed in relations between States;

- A world in which there were agreed standards of international behaviour;

- A world in which effective means of enforcing international agreements and settling disputes had been established and were utilized;

- A world in which there prevailed a spirit of confidence, openness, and a recognized community of interests among States.

6. This is, basically, the context of general and complete disarmament foreseen in the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961. While we must be careful, in discussing disarmament guidelines, not to lift out of context excerpts from earlier agreements, it is relevant to note that the first of the 1961 Principles states that -

> "The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/5)

7. We believe that progress towards such a world, towards halting the competition in arms and towards general and complete disarmament can and indeed must be made. As we look back over the 1960s we see that advances have already been made. As we look forward to the 1970s we see reason to hope that greater progress will be registered. But continuing progress towards general and complete disarmament will not depend exclusively on our planning or negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It will depend in large part upon the existence of a suitable international political climate, important aspects of which will be:

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- The steadfastness of States in pursuing their interests in a spirit of accommodation and in accordance with the fundamental principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations;

- Strengthening the United Nations through the creation of effective machinery for international peacekeeping;

- Regional efforts to develop institutions to preserve the peace and to cope with local problems and disputes;

- A desire on the part of all important military Powers to associate themselves with existing constraints on armaments and to enhance prospects for effective disarmament negotiations.

8. In discussing the framework for a durable peace in his report on foreign policy for the 1970s, President Nixon pointed out that "peace requires a willingness to negotiate". And he went on to say that we "are working toward the day when all nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance."

9. With respect to regional peacekeeping, Articles 33 and 52 of the United Nations Charter envisage regional efforts that can contribute to preserving peace. We should note that some successes in regional mediation of disputes have been scored in the past decade. More effective regional action should be encouraged as the institutions for regional action evolve. And, if we are to move towards a world conducive to greater progress in disarmament, it is of importance that the United Nations do the job called for by its Charter in maintaining peace. United Nations peacekeeping should be developed to contain violence and to prevent the escalation of conflicts. What is required here is the determination of all United Nations Members to use United Nations institutions effectively. The co-operation of contending parties will certainly be required, as well as the support of those nations on which the United Nations must depend for manpower and funds.

10. I have touched on issues that are beyond the immediate range of our negotiations in order to highlight the context in which progress toward general and complete disarmament can be made. It is that context that we must keep constantly in mind if our debate on this issue is to be realistic.

11. I shall turn now to some general aspects of arms races and of arms control and disarmament measures. When we speak about stopping arms races we should keep in mind the great diversity of forces at work in the world making arms races what they

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are, the wide range of governmental and even individual activities related to them, and the variety of approaches that have been suggested for bringing arms races under control. We are dealing here indeed with the realm of modern science and technology, with decisions about weapon systems, force levels and deployments, and with concepts of deterrence, stability and credibility. Our subject is inextricably bound together with basic national security concerns, with alliance and treaty commitments, and with other facets of foreign, domestic and ideological policies. It is influenced by the activities of all States interacting with one another and by domestic priorities and public attitudes.

12. I have mentioned a few of the almost limitless aspects of our problem, not to discourage the Committee from taking up the challenge the United Nations General Assembly has presented to us, but rather as a backdrop for the approach that we shall suggest today. This approach involves, first, a recognition of the context in which we in this Committee work -- that is, a continually-changing world whose future, as we all know, neither the representatives in these negotiations nor their governments can confidently predict or completely control. It is this world, and not abstract concepts, that will be the framework for arms control and disarmament.

13. If we stop to think for a minute about the world as it is likely to develop during the 1970s, we must recognize that it will be neither a static nor a placid world. The pattern of international politics is changing, and perhaps faster now than at any time since the Second World War. This process of change, of accelerating scientific discoveries and social evolution, is inevitable -- in fact, it is essential for progress; but it is also a process accompanied by turbulence. It is in terms of this world that governments will decide their disarmament policies during the decade of the 1970s.

14. I noticed with interest at our meeting last Thursday that the representative of Japan expressed some important ideas about general and complete disarmament, which I think it would be well for us to keep in mind. Referring to the decade of the 1970s, the Disarmament Decade, as a time of rapid change, he said:

> "... the replacement of suspicion and distrust by the principle of openness and the spirit of international solidarity is the key to the attainment of general and complete disarmament." (CCD/PV.471, para. 35)

Mr. Tanaka also called to our attention that disarmament and security are closely interrelated. He said:

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"... we have no intention of turning our eyes away from the hard fact that the national security of the States of the world is dependent upon the existence of a military balance; nor can we deny that there are extremely difficult problems involved in achieving general and complete disarmament." (ibid., para.33)

15. There is, of course, another side to the interaction between disarmament and world affairs. The successful negotiation of arms control and disarmament measures, and broad adherence to them, can contribute to the improvement of international relations. The elaboration of arms-control treaties reflecting the interests of many countries demonstrates how relations among States can be altered and organized to the general benefit. And the implementation of such measures encourages a broad spectrum of international co-operation. This experience in turn helps to establish the mutual confidence that can lead to still further progress towards disarmament and towards a peaceful world in general.

16. There are, of course, other direct benefits from progress in arms control and disarmament. President Nixon pointed out in his foreign policy report that --

"The traditional course of seeking security primarily through military strength raises several problems in a world of multiplying strategic weapons:

-- Modern technology makes any balance precarious and prompts new efforts at ever higher levels of complexity;

-- Such an arms race absorbs resources, talents and energies;

-- The more intense the competition, the greater the uncertainty about the other side's intentions;

-- The higher the levels of armaments, the greater the violence and devastation should deterrence fail."

17. The considerations I have described lead us to view arms control and disarmament as a complex of efforts at many levels, of efforts that attempt to deal, at times simultaneously, with the many individual but interrelated aspects of the whole range of arms and security issues. For so complex a field cannot be dealt with effectively through one simple, direct process.

18. There are several ways in which progress in arms control and disarmament can be achieved:

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- Through multilateral negotiation of global measures like the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the outer-space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), Annex), and the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*);

- Through regional negotiations and arrangements such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186, pp. 12-33), possible mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe, and possible arms limitations in areas of local conflict;

- Through bilateral negotiations like the current United States-Soviet discussions on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT); and

- Through unilateral decisions which might be emulated or reciprocated by other States.

19. While formal negotiations have so far led to the greatest achievements, and while multilateral negotiations of global measures are of particular significance for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we should not overlook the importance of steps that States can take individually. These can include decisions to forego or limit new weapons systems, to scale down standing forces, to encourage public awareness of the need for restraint in arms development, and to improve the possibilities for effective verification of agreements.

20. In referring to his decision on chemical and biological weapons, President Nixon stated that -

"We are prepared to take any unilateral arms control action that will not compromise our security and will minimize the danger that certain weapons will ever be developed or used by any nation".

21. Turning from the method to the substance of arms control and disarmament measures, we can identify several forms of classification. First, measures can be considered, as they were in the agenda adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1968 (ENDC/236, p. 3), in terms of:

- Measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament;

- Non-nuclear measures; other collateral measures; and

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- General and complete disarmament. They can also be considered, along the lines suggested in our report last year to the General Assembly of the United Nations, as:

- Confidence-building measures;

- Measures to prevent armaments; measures to limit armament; and

- Measures of disarmament (CCD/274, p.7). There is another method of categorization which I think we should keep in mind, namely:

- Measures already achieved;

- Measures that might be negotiated under present conditions;

- And measures that might be negotiated in the future as progress is made toward a peaceful world.

22. The United States delegation believes that all of those classifications are valid; but the last one seems to us to be the most useful in terms of advancing our work. For unless a measure accords with the realities of world affairs, the measure will not be achieved simply by including it in some sort of schedule. It is therefore a major responsibility of this Committee to identify those measures that do accord with present world realities or the realities of the immediate future.

23. It will be central in a discussion based on this approach to have the expression by any delegation of its views on whether particular measures can and should be elaborated immediately or considered at a later time. We believe, however, that it is likely to be futile and perhaps even harmful to engage in debates in which we attempt to produce an agreement on a particular order of measures. For the point of our discussions should not be to draw up elaborate charts -- such charts do not determine whether proposals become widely-accepted international agreements. Rather, the point is to develop a consensus on which proposals are ripe or will soon be ripe for serious, detailed negotiations.

24. The main point, then, of the 1969 resolution of the United Nations on general and complete disarmament is, in our view, a very simple, straightforward question: where do we stand today in the field of arms control and disarmament, and what are our prospects for the future? In answering this question it is useful first to review what has already been achieved, since past efforts have left us with unfinished business and have perhaps opened opportunities for further steps.

25. One of the most important measures achieved through negotiations before the Second World War was the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev. 1, Annex VI). This

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measure limits the use, or at least the first use, of certain types of weapons. It does not, however, prevent or limit the development of these armaments. That task is still ahead of us.

26. After the war the first measure achieved was the Antarctic Treaty[1/], which is now more than a decade old. This measure limits all armaments in one part of the world; it has encouraged international co-operation and scientific research, and it has been an example for later agreements.

27. In 1963 we achieved the limited test-ban Treaty, which placed certain restraints on the testing of nuclear weapons and limited radio-active contamination of the atmosphere. The preamble expressed the intention of the parties to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

28. In 1967 negotiations were completed on the Latin-American nuclear-free zone, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a measure which prohibits the acquisition of nuclear weapons in a specific region of the world. Moreover, 1967 saw the entry into force of the outer-space Treaty, which prevents the introduction of nuclear weapons in an area which man is just beginning to explore. The outer-space Treaty made a significant contribution to strategic stability.

29. The non-proliferation Treaty, which came into effect this year, is, we belive, the most significant arms-control step to date. The non-proliferation Treaty has highlighted the need for further arms-control and disarmament negotiations; and these are in fact under way today. The Treaty will facilitate the continuation and expansion of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the successful implementation of the safeguards envisaged in its article III will represent an unprecedented advance in the scope and importance of international safeguards.

30. I turn now to measures that might be negotiated in the light of the present world situation. During the past year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted careful study to the problem of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. An early agreement banning biological agents is clearly possible; it would be a significant disarmament measure. We have made a great

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

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deal of progress in negotiating a prohibition on the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. I might note here that the complexities we have encountered in fashioning a widely-acceptable measure for the sea-bed illustrate how international concerns outside the area of arms control and disarmament interact with the work of this Committee.

31. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is also studying the problems involved in achieving a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, a subject to which the General Assembly has attached great urgency. The United States delegation has proposed negotiation of a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons; and a number of other delegations have strongly supported that proposal.

32. That is not a compendium of all measures that have in one form or another been put forward by various delegations; but it is sufficiently extensive to bring us to the next question: what further measures do members of the Committee believe have serious possibilities of being negotiated now or in the near future? The identification of such measures would be an important element of the task that the General Assembly has placed before us.

33. The United States delegation cannot presume to answer that question for the Committee. We do, however, have a suggestion as to how we might proceed -- a suggestion consistent with the desire of several delegations that we find ways to achieve a higher output and a broader scope for our work. Our suggestion is that the members of the Committee look at the problem of arms races as a whole and examine which elements are already being attacked and which are not. Most measures of disarmament and arms limitation that have been proposed in recent years deal principally with weapons of mass destruction. That is as it should be. These weapons must be brought under control. But should we not be concerned about other aspects of arms competition?

34. I should like to suggest that all members of the Committee consider what measures might be achieved relating to armaments that they already possess or might feel some pressure to acquire. How could such measures be negotiated? When might they be considered? Such suggestions would, of course, be particularly

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valuable coming from the countries directly concerned. We make that proposal in all seriousness, even though I know that some may be tempted to pass it off with a reference to "disarming the unarmed". In fact we all have and acquire arms; and the responsibility for controlling them in a world in which conflict is likely to continue lies with the entire international community. Moreover, progress towards general and complete disarmament will be made not only by halting present arms races but also by preventing the initiation of new arms races. It is easier for nations to reach agreements now to prevent arms races than to attempt to control them once they are under way.

35. Some delegations have suggested that progress could be made if the United States and the Soviet Union were to revise their general and complete disarmament plans of the early 1960s in the light of developments since that time. But I wonder here whether we cannot learn from our earlier experience. What progress was made when we attempted that approach to disarmament? After twenty-one meetings in 1962 the Committee adopted, ad referendum, a draft preamble for the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1). That preamble had three sets of brackets indicating basic language on which agreement had not been reached. After forty-five meetings the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a paper covering three articles. The title of that paper was "Working Draft of Part I of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (in a Peaceful World)" (ENDC/40/Rev.1). The three articles outlined in that co-Chairmen's draft contained some thirty sets of brackets indicating language preferred by one or the other Government but not acceptable to both. After twenty more meetings the United States and the Soviet Union were able to propose one more article, article 4 (ENDC/55), and that with nine sets of brackets. I would hope that members of the Committee who think that this approach is productive would review the verbatim records of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for that period. In fact, we began to make real progress towards general and complete disarmament when we began to examine what we could accomplish with respect to individual measures.

36. When we look to the future we can expect that further moves towards disarmament will be interrelated, as steps have been in the past. Every new measure introduces a new factor into international affairs. Some measures may serve as a catalyst

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for further progress; others will increase international co-operation. Both our experience in carrying out important disarmament measures and the general political situation will inevitably have an important bearing on the scope and nature of subsequent agreements.

37. Let us keep it in mind that arms-control measures, singly and in succession, have benefits beyond their immediate specific terms. They have an important effect on the atmosphere in which governments make their decisions concerning armaments and disarmament possibilities. During the 1950s most governments probably expected that the arms race would continue to spiral upwards. Today, however, many are no longer certain that this will happen. The measures that have been achieved, the forces of international co-operation they have set in motion and the further negotiations they have engendered have helped to create an expectation throughout the world that armaments may level off or even spiral downwards. Thus, although the problems with which we are dealing often seem intractable, we must continue to try to solve them in a realistic and purposeful way, keeping in mind that too slow a pace could result in a loss of momentum which could impair the relatively favourable atmosphere that our earlier measures helped to create.

38. I have set forth in some detail today the views of the United States delegation on how we believe progress can be made towards our common goal of general and complete disarmament. I hope that during this session other delegations which have thoughts to contribute will also express their views on general and complete disarmament in our plenary meetings. Our delegation believes that that is the best way to proceed in considering this complex subject, since it will give all of us an opportunity to exchange ideas and to study carefully the contributions of all members of the Committee.

39. Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): On behalf of the Hungarian delegation, may I say a few words of welcome to the newly-appointed representatives of Bulgaria, Ambassador Petrov; of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka; and of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg? It is also a pleasure for us to see again in our midst the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Castañeda, and Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, representative of Argentina. The Hungarian delegation assures them all of its sincere co-operation.

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40. During its last session the Committee paid great attention to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.1). In the view of the Hungarian delegation the joint draft treaty, revised for the second time (CCD/269/Rev.2), which was submitted on 23 April by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States, promotes and ensures the further progress of our work. It is on that draft treaty that I wish to offer my brief comments today.

41. My delegation would like first of all to congratulate the two co-Chairmen on the submission of that new version, whereby they have contributed significantly to the elaboration of a draft treaty to be presented to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. They have facilitated also the early and successful conclusion of the negotiations on the subject.

42. Having studied the revised draft treaty which is now before the Committee, my delegation believes that with regard to substance and legal aspects it is a refinement of former versions.

43. That, we feel, is proved by articles I and II, which remove the possibilities of misunderstanding and differences of opinion concerning the determination of the area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for the purpose of the treaty. The definition incorporated in the latest version does not affect the views and standpoints concerning certain issues of international maritime law, of States that are not parties to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone signed in Geneva on 29 April 1958.[1/]

44. A newly-drafted text for article III was also presented by the co-authors. Having studied it, we can see that the present wording of that article makes allowances for the observations and remarks put forward by a number of States during the debate on the previous draft. As Mr. Roshchin pointed out when he presented the revised draft at our meeting on 23 April this year:

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 516, pp. 205 et seq.

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"... the text of this article should be regarded as a synthesis of the views and positions of States on the problem of control over compliance with the obligations assumed under the treaty."
(CCD/PV.467, para. 15)

45. My delegation is in full agreement with that remark; and therefore we regard as disquieting and unacceptable the inclusion in the draft treaty of such measures as those urged by the representative of Canada on 28 April (CCD/PV.468, paras. 8 and 9). In our view, insistence on the inclusion of such measures would only make the situation unnecessarily complicated and would further delay the elaboration of the draft treaty, the more so since the present wording of article III provides an opportunity for all States parties concerned to participate, through mutual consultations and measures, in the verification of the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the treaty. On the other hand, the chances of the United Nations Secretary-General or any other outstanding international personality being able to carry out good offices would be neither increased nor lessened by the mere fact of whether or not this question was mentioned in a certain international treaty.

46. In the view of the Hungarian delegation the verification procedures contained in article III, supplemented by the possibility that the States concerned, if they felt it necessary, could refer the matter to the Security Council, provide a proper settlement of the question of verification. We are convinced that the elaborate system of verification proposed can promote the observation and implementation of the treaty and will therefore provide the States parties to the treaty with adequate guarantees.

47. As a great number of speakers have emphatically stressed, the purpose of this treaty is the prevention of the spread of the nuclear arms race to the sea-bed and the ocean floor. It is not meant, however, to take a stand on or to settle those problems of international maritime law which should fall within the competence of other international conferences and should be the subject of other international treaties. My delegation believes that article IV of the draft serves to avoid any misunderstanding and to ensure the achievement of full agreement, since its text expresses clearly and unambiguously the standpoint

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in this respect of the parties to the treaty. We can only welcome the idea of the co-authors that this question should be settled in a separate article -- that is, article IV of the revised draft treaty.

48. It was on the suggestion of Mexico that article VIII was included in the new draft. We find its significance to be that it prevents any possible misunderstanding or contradiction that may arise from other international treaties of a similar nature.

49. My delegation has had occasion previously to express its view on the third preambular paragraph. We would have preferred to see that provision among the operative articles of the draft treaty, in a manner similar to that of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). If such an operative article were included in the treaty, it would define more definitely the aims which the signatories are determined to achieve.

50. We raise that question now because at the meeting of our Committee on 28 April the Canadian representative requested the co-authors of the draft to consider the possibility of including in article III a reference to "international procedures or good offices -- including those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." (CCD/PV.468, para. 8) If the co-authors find it possible at a later stage of our negotiations to study the suggestion of the Canadian delegation, which was supported at the same meeting by the representative of Italy (ibid., para. 25), my delegation would request them to study also the feasibility of making the present third preambular paragraph into a separate article in the operative part of the draft treaty. We believe that would make a significant contribution to the elaboration of an even more refined draft, and would create harmony with the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, which is already in effect.

51. The draft treaty submitted on 23 April by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States pays due attention to the observations and suggestions for modification or addition that were put forward when this Committee or the General Assembly considered previous texts. The Hungarian delegation believes that all the conditions now exist for the conclusion of the consideration of the

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draft treaty as soon as possible. My delegation therefore accepts the text of the draft presented at the 467th meeting by the two co-Chairmen of this Committee, and supports its submission to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We do so in the belief that this draft treaty will constitute the first step towards the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 472nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Kamaluddin Ahmed, representative of Pakistan.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America and Hungary.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 25 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.